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DAWSON V. HINSHAW MUSIC, INC.: THE
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVISITS ARNSTEIN




The Fourth Circuit's recent decision in Dawson v. Hinshaw Music,
Inc.1 considered the manner in which a plaintiff in a music copyright
infringement case establishes substantial similarity of competing
works. The court held that where the subject works were created for
an audience which has special knowledge, skill or expertise, and
where members of that audience will likely base their "purchasing
decisions" upon their special knowledge, skill or expertise, the trier
of fact must consider evidence of that audience's likely reaction to
the competing works in determining whether the works are substan-
tially similar. The court thus limited the "ordinary lay observer" test
- which has been followed in music copyright cases since the Sec-
ond Circuit's decision in Arnstein v. Porter2 - to cases involving
works created for the general public. Interestingly, these important
and previously unresolved issues arose in a case involving compet-
ing derivative works: two arrangements of the Negro spiritual
"Ezekiel Saw de Wheel", a song which is in the public domain. The
case also involved a famous composer, arranger and conductor
who, regrettably, did not live to learn of the Fourth Circuit's
decision.
A. Introduction: Th2e Artistry of William L. Dawson
At his death in May, 1990 at the age of 89, William Levi Dawson
was respected internationally as a composer, an arranger, and as the
conductor of the famed Tuskegee Choir of Tuskegee Institute in Al-
abama.3 Dawson's primary interest was in the traditional Negro spir-
ituals, which Dawson believed expressed the emotions and
experiences of the Negro slaves in America.4 Those songs were not
* Partner, Mays & Valentine; B.A. 1977, University of Virginia (Distinction);
J.D. 1983, University of Tennessee (High Honors).
** Partner, Feinman and Krasilovsky, P.C.; B.A., L.L.B. 1947, Cornell Univer-
sity; J.D. 1949, Cornell Law School.
1. 905 F.2d 731 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 511 (1990).
2. 154 F.2d 464 (2nd Cir. 1946).
3. One of Dawson's most important triumphs was the 1934 performance of his
"Negro Folk Symphony" by the Philadelphia Orchestra, the famous Leopold
Stokowski conducting.
4. Schwartz, Composers Whio Had to Triumph Over Prejudice, N.Y. Times,
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composed by any individual songwriters, but were rather the cre-
ations of the generations of blacks which never knew economic, so-
cial or political freedom in America.
Dawson once stated that
[tio interpret [the traditional spirituals] properly, one must become
familiar with the conditions and circumstances which gave birth to
them. It is equally important to study the characteristics of the
music itself, to catch the mood and feel of it, in order to express
adequately the sentiments that it embodies.
5
Dawson's sentiment was shared by the great composer Bella Bartok,
who also acknowledged the challenge inherent in arranging folk
tunes and spirituals. The special character of that music, according
to Bartok, required the arranger to
penetrate into [the music], feel it, and bring it out in sharp contours
by the appropriate setting. The composition round a folk tune [or
spiritual] must be done in a "propitious hour" or - as is generally
said - it must be a work of inspiration just as much as any [original]
composition.
6
Thus, the creation of arrangements of spirituals and folk hymns re-
quire application of special talents and inspiration; and the creation
of such derivative works is protected by the copyright laws, just like
original scores. 7
The arrangement which may ultimately bring Mr. Dawson's name
Apr. 15, 1990, sec. 2, at 29, col. 1 (late ed.) (hereinafter referred to as "Schwartz
Article").
5. Id.
6. Smith, Arrangements and Editions of Public Domain Music, 34 CASE W. Rxs.
L. Rzv. 104, 109 n.29 (1983).
7. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103 (1988). THz NEW OxfoRD COMPANION TO MusIc
includes the following definition of a musical arrangement:
The adaptation to one musical medium of music originally composed
for another - the recasting of a song as a piano piece, of an orchestral
overture as an organ piece, and so on....
Such a process, if undertaken seriously, involves much more than sim-
ply transferring passages from one medium to the other, since many
passages that are effective on one instrument would sound ludicrous, or at
any rate much less effective, on another. The arranger should consider,
not how nearly he can reproduce a given passage in the new medium, but
rather how the composer would have written it had that medium been the
original one.
THE NEW OXFORD COMPANION TO MusIc 107-8 (1983). See also CoMPE nUM OF Copy-
moR Orc. PRAcrIcES (CohwEminum II)§ 408.01 (1984). ("A musical arrangement
is a work which results from the addition of a new harmony to a preexisting work.
The standard of originality for arrangements takes into consideration the fact that a
melody carries with it a certain amount of implied harmony."); U.S. DEPARTmrNT OF
LABoR DIcrIoNARY OF OccuPATIoNAL TITLS (4th ed. 1977) ("Arranger" is one who
"transcribes musical compositions for orchestra, band, choral group, or individual
to adapt composition to particular style for which it is not originally written: Deter-
mines voice, instrument, harmonic structure, rhythm, tempo, and tone balance to
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the most attention - certainly, at least, in the legal profession - is his
interpretation of the Negro spiritual "Ezekiel Saw de Wheel", a
traditional song which is in the public domain. That arrangement
was the subject to the Fourth Circuit's decision in Dawson v. Hin-
shaw Music, Inc., which restated the "substantial similarity" test
which has been applied in music copyright cases for almost fifty
years. In restating the test, the court focused on the purpose under-
lying the protection of copyrights: to ensure creators may benefit
economically from their labors.
B. Arnstein and the "Substantial Similarity" Test
Judge Frank's opinion in Arnstein v. Porter 8 is recognized as one
of the leading early decisions in music copyright law. The case in-
volved alleged infringements of several popular songs. In reversing
in part a summary judgment for the defendant, the Second Circuit
held that a plaintiff alleging music copyright infringement must first
prove that it has a valid copyright, and that the infringer had access
to the subject work.9 Once those elements are established, the
plaintiff must show the substantial similarity of the competing works:
the similarity not only of the "general ideas" of the works - referred
to as the objective component of the substantial similarity test - but
also the expression of those ideas, or the subjective component of
the test.
The Arnstein court stated that to demonstrate competing works
are objectively similar, testimony by trained professional musicians
of their analysis or dissection of the competing works is relevant.1 0
The Arnstein court further held that since the competing works at
issue were popular songs played for and sold to the general public,
the subjective component of the test - which considered, among
other things, whether the competing works evoked the same feel-
ings and emotions - was to be determined by the "ordinary lay
hearer", without the benefit of any help from the experts. The court
explained that
[t]he plaintiff's legally protected interest is not, as such, his reputa-
tion as a musician but his interest in the potential financial returns
from his compositions which derive from the lay public's approba-
tion of his efforts. The question, therefore, is whether defendant
took from plaintiff's works so much of what is pleasing to the ears
of lay listeners, who comprise the audience for whom such popu-
lar music is composed, that defendant wrongfully appropriated
achieve desired effect. Writes score utilizing knowledge of music theory and in-
strumental and vocal capabilities.")
8. 154 F.2d 464 (2nd Cir. 1946).
9. Id. at 468.
10. Id.
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something which belongs to the plaintiff."
Thus, if the competing work incorporated such significant portions
of the original work which as might affect a potential buyer's deci-
sion to purchase the work, then there was copyright infringement.' 2
The test set forth in Arnstein makes sense when applied to com-
peting works of popular music which were sold to the general pub-
lic. For instance, ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisong's Music, Ltd. 13
involved the alleged infringement of George Harrison's "My Sweet
Lord" of the Chiffon's hit song "He's So Fine". Given that record-
ings of the songs were intended to be played for and sold to the
public at large, the purchasing audience would, indeed, be the ordi-
nary, untrained observer. In such an instance, it was appropriate -
and necessary - to play the competing works for the fact finder.
An issue that remained unresolved for years after Arnstein, how-
ever, was whether the ordinary observer test was applicable where
the subject work was intended for a narrower audience. 1 4 A key
decision concerning the ordinary observer test outside the music
copyright area helped change the focus of the ordinary observer
test. Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc." in-
volved competing computer programs that were so complicated that
it was impossible to expect a lay jury or a judge sitting without a jury
11. Id. at 473 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
12. In his dissenting opinion in Arnstein, Judge Clark bemoaned the invasion of
the hallowed halls of justice by the sounds of popular music. Judge Clark com-
plained that
the tinny tintannabulations of the music thus canned resounded through
the United States Courthouse to the exclusion of all else, including the
real issues in this case. Of course, sound is important in a case of this kind
as to falsify what the eye reports and the mind teaches. Otherwise, plagia-
rism would be suggested by the mere drumming of repetitious sound from
our usual popular music, as it issues from a piano, orchestra or hurdy
gurdy - particularly when ears may be dulled by long usage, possible
artistic repugnance or boredom, or mere distance, which causes all sounds
to merge. And the judicial eardrum may be peculiarly insensitive after
long years of listening to the 'beat, beat, beat,'... of sound upon it, though
perhaps no more so than the ordinary citizen juror - even if tone deafness
is made a disqualification for jury service, as advocated.
154 F.2d at 475-76.
13. 420 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), later opinion, 508 F. Supp. 788 (S.D.N.Y.
1981), modified, 722 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1983).
14. Over the years, the copyright decisions which purported to apply Arnstein
were not always consistent, and did not always comprehend - let alone resolve -
those matters left by Arnstein. The courts' applications of Arnstein have been de-
scribed as "spotty" and "uneven". See 3 NIMMER oN CoP'Riowr § 13.03(E)(3d ed.
1989). Compare, e.g., Aliotti v. R. Dakin & Co., 831 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987) and
Sid & Marty Krofft Television, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir.
1977) with Baxter v. MCA, Inc., 812 F.2d 421 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.,
Williams v. Baxter, 484 U.S. 954 (1987).
15. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cer. denied, 479 U.S. 1031, 107 S.Ct. 877,
93 L.Ed. 2d 831 (1987).
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to make comparisons for substantial similarity without expert witness
assistance. The Third Circuit held in Whtelan that the ordinary ob-
server test simply could not be applied where the original work was
beyond the comprehension of the ordinary general public. Whelan
was a logical decision as applied to complex computer programs;
an issue left unresolved was whether the courts would apply the
same analysis to other subject areas, including the music industry.
C. The Trial Court's Decision
"Ezekiel Saw De Wheel" was first published in 1940 by John W.
Work in a collection of spiritual and folk hymns. The words and
melody of "Ezekiel" are in the public domain.1 6 Dawson registered
his copyright of his arrangement of "Ezekiel" with the United States
Copyright Office in 1942.1' Over the next twenty-five years, Daw-
son - acting as his own publisher - sold thousands of copies of the
sheet music of his arrangement.1 ' Since 1967, Kjos Music has
served as Dawson's exclusive agent for the sale and distribution of
the arrangement, and has sold in excess of 113,000 copies of the
sheet music.' 9
Gilbert M. Martin, a graduate of Westminister Choir College,
composed an arrangement of "Ezekiel" in 1980.20 That same year,
Martin granted to Hinshaw Music, Inc. the exclusive right to publish,
distribute and sell his arrangement. In 1981, Hinshaw obtained a
copyright of Martin's arrangement and began publication and sales
of the sheet music. 2'
When Dawson became aware of Martin's arrangement, he notified
Hinshaw that he considered it to be an unlawful infringement of his
copyrighted arrangement. Hinshaw suspended distribution of the
Martin arrangement in 1981, but resumed publication the next
year.22
In June 1986, Dawson filed suit in the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Louisiana, alleging that Hinshaw had in-
fringed on his copyright by publishing the Martin arrangement of
"Ezekiel". Thereafter, Dawson added Martin as a defendant, and
the case was later transferred to the Middle District of North
Carolina.
16. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered December 21, 1988, by
the trial court in Dawson v. Hinshaw Music, Inc., United States District Court for the
Middle District of North Carolina, Durham Division (hereinafter cited as "Find-
ings") at 2.
17. Registration No. e. Pub. No. 108,496.
18. Findings at 2.
19. Id. at 2-3.
20. Id. at 3-4.
21. Id. at 4.
22. Id. at 7.
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A bench trial was held on August 22-24, 1988, before the Honor-
able Hiram H. Ward. The exhibits introduced at trial included the
sheet music of the Work song, the sheet music of the two competing
arrangements of "Ezekiel", and the sheet music of other arrange-
ments of the song. The witnesses who testified included Dawson,
Martin, representatives of Kjos Music and Hinshaw Music, and five
experts retained by the parties.23
In his Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Judge Ward held
that Dawson owned a valid copyright to his arrangement of
"Ezekiel". 24 The court stated that a rebuttable presumption of copy-
ing would arise if Dawson proved 1) that Martin had access to the
copyrighted work, and 2) that there was a substantial similarity be-
tween the Dawson work and the Martin work. 2s
The trial court found that defendant Martin has the requisite ac-
cess to Dawson's arrangement through his access to the facilities of
Westminister Choir College and Lorenz Publishing Company;26 his
extensive experience in arranging, conducting and performing cho-
ral works; Dawson's reputation as an arranger and director of choral
music; the widespread distribution of Dawson's arrangements; and
the specialized and narrow field of music within which Dawson's ar-
rangement was created.27
The trial court then turned its attention to the substantial similarity
test. On the objective component of the test, the trial court consid-
ered the experts' analysis and dissection of the arrangements. Daw-
son's experts on this issue were Dr. Robert Campbell and Dr.
Herndon Spillman; defendants' experts were Drs. Alice Parker, Wil-
ton Mason, and Joel J. Carter. The court found the testimony of
Dawson's experts compelling, and concluded that "the pattern,
theme and organization of [Dawson's] arrangement is unique among
any other arrangement" of "Ezekiel". 28 The court accepted Dr.
Spillman's testimony that Martin not only used the same arranging
devices as Dawson, but also organized those devices in the same
exact pattern or structure as the Dawson work, and employed them
in the same sequence and place as the Dawson work.29 The trial
court further noted that defendants did not refute that testimony;
and, in fact, their experts had only reinforced the similarities in the
works.3 0 The court thus held that the two arrangements were sub-
23. Excerpts of transcript trial proceedings, joint appendix.
24. Findings at 2.
25. Id. at 9-11.
26. Interestingly, Dawson's arrangement had been dedicated to the then Presi-
dent of Westminister, Dr. J. Finley Williamson. Id. at 11.
27. Id. at 11-13.
28. Id. at 14-18. The trial court listed twenty-two similarities and nine differ-
ences between competing arrangements. See Findings at 4-7.
29. Id. at 16-17.
30. Id. at 17-18.
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stantially similar under the objective component of the test.3 '
Judge Ward then addressed what he considered the dispositive
issue: whether Dawson had satisfied the subjective component of
the test, under which the court, "unaided by analytic dissection or
expert testimony," was to see if it could "'recognize the alleged
copy as having been appropriated from the copyrighted work.' ",32
The court noted that Dawson had failed to present any evidence
other than the printed sheet music of the arrangements, which the
court deemed insufficient proof of substantial similarity in the ex-
pression of the idea. The court specifically stated that the expert
testimony which it had found so persuasive on the objective compo-
nent of the test was "irrelevant to and inadmissible under the second
prong to show substantial similarity constituting infringement of ex-
pression."33 The court stated Dawson's failure to play the compet-
ing arrangements for the court was a fatal flaw in the case, despite
the fact 1) that Dawson and Martin had both benefited financially
not from sales of recordings of the music to the public, but rather
from sales of the sheet music, and 2) that there was no evidence that
recordings of either arrangement were ever sold to the public or
even existed.
The trial court's conclusion is interesting given remarks made
early in the course of the proceeding which strikes at the heart of
the Dawson case and the "audience test". In responding to coun-
sel's question on the first day of trial concerning the admissibility of
expert testimony, Judge Ward stated as follows:
Well, Rule 702 [of the Federal Rules of Evidence] seems to cover
this just like a blanket covers a bed. I am not a musician. I was
exposed to it a couple of years when I was a teenager. I appreci-
ate good music. I appreciate music whether it's good or bad, for
the most part. But this is a very technical thing and I am going to
rely on experts with reference to the substantial similarity test.
Also I think I have enough experience to not depend on expert
testimony when they go beyond their field of expertise.
3 4
Interestingly, and as noted above, the trial court had based its
finding that Martin had the requisite access to Dawson's arrange-
ment in part upon the observation that the competing arrangements
were made in "the specialized and narrow field" of sacred Negro
spiritual music. The trial court did not profess to have any knowl-
31. Id. at 16-18.
32. Id. at 18-19 (quoting Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu Ltd., 360 F.2d 1021, 1022
(2d Cir. 1966)).
33. Id. at 20.
34. Trial Transcript at 3-4 (emphasis added). Under Rule 702, [i]f scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training or education, may testify thereto in the form
of an opinion or otherwise.
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edge of or experience in that field, let alone the ability to read and
understand the sheet music of the competing arrangements. Nor did
the trial court consider whether there was a special audience for
which the sheet music was intended to be sold. And despite Judge
Ward's stated intent to rely on the experts, all of whom were familiar
with "the specialized and narrow field" of sacred Negro spiritual
music, and could read and understand the sheet music, he com-
pletely ignored their testimony as such applied to the central issue
of the case.
D. The Fourth Circuit's Analysis
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit re-examined Arnstein against the
backdrop of "the recognized purpose of the copyright laws of pro-
viding creators with a financial incentive to create for the ultimate
benefit of the public."' s3 The Fourth Circuit recognized that the
Arnstein court had correctly applied an ordinary "lay listener" test
because the music at issue in that case was intended for sale to the
public at large. Thus, the reaction of the untrained lay listener
would gauge how the infringer's work might affect the plaintiff's in-
tended market. 3
The Fourth Circuit further concluded, however, "where the in-
tended audience is significantly more specialized than the pool of
lay listeners, the reaction of the intended audience would be the
relevant inquiry." 37 The court cited with approval the Ninth Cir-
cuit's decision in Sid & Marty Krofft Television v. McDonald's
Corp.3 8 which involved a claim of infringement by the creators of
"H.R. Pufnstuf" children's television show against McDonald's for
production of its "McDonaldland" television commercials. There,
the Ninth Circuit wrote that
[t]he present case demands an even more intrinsic determination
because both plaintiffs' and defendants' works are directed to an
audience of children. This raises the particular factual issue of the
impact of the respective works upon the minds and imagination of
young people.39
35. Dawson v. Hinshaw Music, Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 733 (4th Cir.) cert. denied,
- U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 511, - L.Ed. 2d - (1990).
36. Id. at 734.
37. Id.
38. 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977).
39. Id. at 1166. See also Aliotti v. R. Dakin & Co., 831 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir.
1987) (because children comprised the intended market for the parties' competing
dolls, the court should "filter the intrinsic inquiry through the perception of chil-
dren"); Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Electronics Corp., 672
F.2d 607, 614 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880, 103 S.Ct. 176, 74 L.Ed.2d
145 (1988) (where products were intended for the child audience, products must
be viewed from the perspective of that audience).
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The Fourth Circuit also cited with approval the Third Circuit's de-
cision in Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory,4° which,
as discussed above, involved a claim of infringement of a custom
computer program for dental laboratory records which was so so-
phisticated as to be completely unfamiliar to most members of the
general public. In reflecting on the subject of Whelan, the Fourth
Circuit stated that
only a reckless indifference to common sense would lead a court
to embrace a doctrine that requires a copyright case to turn on the
opinion of someone who is ignorant of the relevant differences
and similarities between two works. Instead, the judgment should
be informed by people who are familiar with the media at issue. 41
That logic led the Fourth Circuit to the conclusion that the second
prong of the substantial similarity test should truly be labeled the
"intended audience" rather than the "ordinary observer" test.42
The court stated that, in most instances, the lay public would likely
represent the intended audience; and in those circumstances, the
competing works should be presented to the untrained lay person
for determination of copying. If the intended audience, however, is
indeed narrower than the general public in that it possesses special-
ized expertise that may affect the "purchasing decision", the trier of
fact must focus on whether a member of the intended audience
would find the two works substantially similar.43 Thus, "testimony
from members of the intended audience or, possibly, from those
who possess expertise with reference to tastes and perceptions of
the intended audience" would be relevant.4 4
The Fourth Circuit thus concluded that Dawson's failure to pres-
ent recordings of the competing arrangements may not have been
fatal to his case. If the audience Dawson sought had specialized
expertise relevant to its purchasing decisions, the competing sheet
music alone may have been sufficient evidence of infringement.4"
The Fourth Circuit remanded the case for consideration of whether
Dawson's spiritual arrangement had an intended audience narrower
than the broad audience to which the common "love ditty [is]
pitched."'46 The district court was further instructed that if on re-
mand it determined that definition of a distinct audience in the case
is appropriate, the "court should then take additional evidence to
40. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031, 107 S.Ct. 877,
93 L.Ed.2d 831 (1987).
41. Dawson, 905 F.2d at 738.
42. Id. at 737.
43. Id. at 736.
44. Id.
45. In fact, putting recordings of the works into evidence could be misleading,
given the testimony at trial that a choral director's interpretation of the arrangement
would affect the sound. Dawson, 905 F.2d at 737.
46. Id. at 737.
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determine whether members of the intended audience would find
the arrangements substantially similar." '47
E. CONCLUSION
The Fourth Circuit's analysis of the substantial similarity test cer-
tainly is sound given the facts adduced at trial. The evidence estab-
lished that Dawson created an arrangement of "Ezekiel" which had
a unique pattern, theme and organization. That arrangement was
commercially significanti as thousands of copies of sheet music were
sold over the years; yet there was no evidence Dawson made any
sales of recorded versions of his arrangement. In light of the princi-
pal underlying objective of copyright law - to protect the economic
benefits of creators - the nature of the market for which Dawson di-
rected his arrangement was critical.
The Dawson decision is the logical outgrowth not only of Whelan
but of the principles stated in Arnstein almost fifty years ago. In this
connection, the sharply different factual backgrounds of the cases
serves to frame the issues critical in music copyright infringement
litigation. In cases such as Arnstein, which involve popular music
such as a Billboard top-twenty song - the "love ditty" referred to by
the Fourth Circuit - the ordinary lay observer test is appropriate.
Certainly, there is no prerequisite that a purchaser of that kind of
music be able to read and understand a musical score. Therefore,
the ordinary lay person, unskilled and untrained in music, should be
in a position to determine if the creator of the allegedly infringing
work took from the original work that which made it commercially
significant.
That analysis should not apply, however, to sophisticated works
such as choral sheet music. While a musical arrangement may nut
be as complex as the computer program at issue in Whelan, detailed
analysis of sheet music relating to multipart choral arrangements
does require musical training. The intended audience for such a
choral piece is not the listening audience, nor even the average
member of a chorus which might sing the work; but rather, a choral
director, teacher or other trained professional in the field who
would decide whether to purchase the music. In that scenario, the
mere process of selecting music is a sophisticated act of a profes-
sionally skilled and trained musician. Thus, it is appropriate for the
court to consider opinion testimony from qualified witnesses having
specialized knowledge of the field to assist the trier of fact in order
to understand the works and the likely reaction of the intended
audience.
The Fourth Circuit's decision also makes sense in light of Rule
702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence which, as Judge Ward sug-
47. Id. at 738.
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gested, did fit this case "just like a blanket covers a bed."'48 When
an expert's testimony will "assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue," that testimony is admissi-
ble and relevant under Rule 702. If the trier of fact can understand
and appreciate the competing works in a music copyright case with-
out an expert's help, opinion evidence should not be admitted.4 9
The Fourth Circuit did not attempt to create a specific test for de-
termining whether the ordinary lay observer test is appropriate in
particular circumstances. That issue must be resolved on a case-by-
case basis according to the applicable facts. The Fourth Circuit
cautioned against departure "from the lay characterization of the or-
dinary observer test."50 Only where the facts proved that an in-
tended audience has knowledge that the lay public lacks should a
court look to a special, narrow group as the intended audience. 1
Because the Dawson case was settled after the denial of certiorari,
the question of whether the ordinary lay observer test was appropri-
ate in the particular circumstances will remain unresolved. The is-
sue of whether there is an intended audience "possessing
specialized knowledge relevant to its purchasing decision" is one
that will likely be raised frequently in copyright cases after Dawson.
A quote attributed to William Dawson appearing in his biography
in Who's Who reads as follows: "I believe that an individual seldom
does his best in any performance. Regardless of how well I perform
an act, the feeling remains that it is possible to do it better; there-
fore, I always strive for improvement.""2 The Fourth Circuit's deci-
sion - issued just four weeks after Mr. Dawson's death - may serve to
improve the protection that composers of musical works will receive
in their pursuit of musical success. It is perhaps fitting that even in
death Mr. Dawson's name will continue to be associated with the
success of musicians and artists.
48. Trial Transcript at 3.
49. See generally M. F. Sitzer, Copyright Infringement Actions: The Proper
Role for Audience Reactions in Determining Substantial Similiarity, 54 S. CAL. L.
Rsv. 385 (1981).
50. 905 F.2d at 737.
51. Id.
52. 1 WHo'S WHO IN AMmRICA 778 (43rd ed. 1984-1985).
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